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The　Social　Construction　of”Evi1”：Comparative
Content　Analysis　between　the　U．S．　and　Japanese
　　　　　　　　　　　　Media　during　the　lraq　War．
Kazuhiro　Maeshima
Introduction
　　Based　on　the　content　analysis　of　both　American　and　Japanese　leading
news　papers’editorials　over　the　war　in　Iraq，　this　paper　explores　the　different
account　of　the　notion　of　7，evilness”the　newspapers　implicitly　and　explicitly
depict．　Special　fbcus　will　be　on　the　fact　that　the　notion　of”evil”is　socially
constructed　by　the　different　historical　and　cultural　backgrounds　between　the
Western（America）and　Eastem（Japan）world．
　　Specifically，　this　paper　has　five　sections：First，　this　paper　extensively
explains　the　basic　ideas　of　the　theory　of　social　construction　and　its
applications　to　the　studies　of　political　communications．　Second，　the
difficulties　to　research　different　cultures　are　examined．　This　section　refers　to
the　debate　over　positivism　in　understanding　different　cultures．　Third，　as　an
example　of　the　difEculties　in　understanding　different　cultUres，　the　different
notion　of”evil”is　demonstrated　by　C．　Fred　Alfbrd，s　comparative　study
between　the　Westem　world　and　South　Korea．　Fo顧h，　results　of　a　qualitative
content　analysis　of　editorials　printed　by　both　American（theハlew　York
Times）and　Japanese（the　Asahi）major　newspapers　over　the　lraq　War　are
presented・Editorials　are　regarded　as　the　best　place　to　look　at　the　qualitative
similarities　and　differences　of　the　tWo　papers　because　editorial　represents　the
newspaper’s　official　positions　on　issues．　The　main　arguments　of　this　section
are　that　both　leading　papers’editorials　framed　a　different　notion　of　”evi1”in
the　War　and　that　different　implications　over　the　word”evir’in　the　two　media
are　socially　constructed．　Finally，　this　paper　concludes　with　a　discussion　of
the　possibility　of飢ure　research　on　comparison　of　the　papers　in　different
cultUres．
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1．The　Theory　of　Social　Construction
　　Social　constnlction　theory　suggests　that　what　we　see　as”real”is　the　result
of　human　interaction．　Through　such　interaction，　we　create　certain　artifacts，
o切ectify　them，　intemalize　them　and　then　take　these　products　fbr　granted．
These　institutionalized　arti飴cts　become”realities，”which　is　the　result　of
韓constructionll　by　participants　in　a　particular　society・Since　the　publication　of
Peter　L，　Berger　and　Thomas　Luckmann’s　The　Social　Construction　ofReality
（1967），the　te㎜”social　constmction1，　has　been　in　the　mainstream　of　the
studies　of　social　sciences，　including　studies　in　political　communication．
A．Stages　and　TypeS　of　Socia1　Constructions
According　to　Berger　and　Luckmann，　there　are　three　stages　in　the　social
construction　of　reality．　The　first　stage　is　externalization，　in　which　we　create
artifacts　through　social　interaction．　In　the　second　stage，　ol～ノectivation　occurs
when　the　artifacts　appear　to　take　on　a　reality　of　their　own　and　become
independent　of　those　who　created　them．　Finally，　in彪rnal伽tion　is　the　stage
in　which　we　leam　such”a　reality”about　the　artifacts　through　some　form　of
SOCialiZatiOn．
　　Language　is　a　quintessential　example　of　artifact　constructed　by　the
participants　in　a　society。　In　any　given　society，　people　create　languages
through　social　interaction　both　in　verbal　and　non－verbal　mamers．　Languages
become　independent　of　creators　when　people　notice　them　and　start　to　use
them．　Further，　we　internalize　languages　by　agreeing　to　fbllow　certain
conventions，　such　as　grammars　and　correct　usage．　It　is　interesting　that
language　is　also　a　strong　vehicle　of　socialization　to　all　aspects　of，grealities脚
because　language　continuously　provides　us　with”necessary　o切ectifications”
and　posits　”the　order”　in　our　everyday　life（Berger　and　Luckmann　1967，
22）．Just　as　pervasive　and　obvious　as　language，　money　is　also　an　obvious
example　of　a　social　constmction　because　people　use　money　as　if　it　has　the
constructed　value　and　agree　to　fbllow　certain　mles　in　its　use．
　　In　social　construction　theory，　it　should　be　noted　that　there　are　two
different”　facts．”While　the　actual　conditions　and　situations　are脚brute　facts，”
social　institutions　or　cultUral　artifacts　are　called”institutional　facts．”Cultural
and　societal　factors　are　one　of　the　maj　or　producers　of”institutional　facts．”
The　two　kinds　of”facts”are　not　always　identical　because”brute　facts’曾are
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not　ontologically　dependent　on四institutional　facts，°’and　vice　versa．
　　The　distinction　between　the　two　kinds　of　llfacts”is　important　in
understanding　less　obvious　examples　of　social　constnlctions．　These　include
class，　race，　religion，　and　sexuality．　The　concepts　ofthese　may　be　constmcted
by　society　in　such　a　way　that　certain　types　of　perception（including　a
stereotyped　view）are　reinfbrced，　although　the”brute　facts”belonging　to　the
concepts　are　different　or　unchanged．　Some　of　these　institutionalized
concepts　are　believed　to　be　arbitrary　and　even　made－up　by　certain　social
interactions，　regardless　ofthe　ggbrute　facts．「’
　　These　less　obvious　concepts　are　more　important　o切ects　of　analyses　in
social　sciences．　One　of　the　most　typical　topics　of　research　relating　to　social
constnlction　deals　with　sexuality．　Scholars　argue　that　categories　of　sex　and
gender　are　socially　constmcted　in　institutional　contexts．　It　has　become　fairly
common　to　separate　biological　sex　from　gender，　claiming　that　there　is　no
inherent　connection　between　the　two．　Scholars，　such　as　Judith　Lorber，　talks
that　the　rules　by　which　biological　women　navigate　the　world　are　prodμcts　in
agiven　society；thus，　there　are　no”brute　facts”that　compels　women　to　wear
dresses，　have　long　hair，　be　nu血ring　toward　children，　cook，　or　clean（Lober
2006）．A皿e　Fausto－Sterling　also　observes　that　the　categories　of　male　and
female　are　not　always　sufficient　to　describe　the　variety　of　sexes，　According
to　Fausto－Sterling，　individuals　born　intersexual　may　constitUte　as　much　as
fbur　percent　of　the　population．　These　infants　are　eventually　become　either
”normal”males　or　females　by　absorbing　and　internalizing　social　conventions
（Fausto－Sterling　2006）．
　　Race　and　ethnicity　is　another　typical　example　in　researching　social
construction．　Omi　and　Winant　argues　that　race　consciousness　is　largely　a
modem　phenomenon．　According　to　these　scholars，　what　is　important　about
the　construction　of　race　categories　in　the　United　States　is　that　race　is　a
sociohistorical　concept，　in　which　racial　categories　and　the　meaning　of　race
are　given　concrete　expression　by　the　specific　social　relations　and　historical
context．　Furthermore，　they　suggest　that　racial　and　ethnic　categories　are
significant　in　that　they　are　constmcted　in　a　hierarchy　f『om”superior”to
”inferior”（Omi　and　Winant　2006）．　In　a　similar　vein，　Karen　Brodkin
illus廿ates　that　Jewish　people，　as　well　as　some　other　immigrants　to　the　United
States　in　the　late　19th　century，　were　once　seen　as　belonging　to　an”inferior
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race．”Economic　and　educational　advancements，　as　well　as　others，　played　an
integral　role　in　constructing　the　immigrants　as”inferior”and　in　later
”reconstructing”them　as　white　and　no　longer　an　inferior　ethnic　group
（Brodkin　2006）．
　　Social　constmction　theory　may　suggest　that　there　are　multiple”realities”
even　fbr　the　same”bnlte　fact．”In　other　words，”realities”are　different　in　the
eyes　of　each　beholder．　These　multiple”realities”is　considered”the
Rashomon　effbct，”named　after　a　famous　movie　Rashomon（1950）．　It　is　the
phenomenon　by　which　observers　of　an　event　produce　a　statement　bearing
substantial　differences，　although　they　experienced　the　same　incident．
B．Social　Constructions　of　Hate　Crime
　　In　order　to　a　give　fUrther　explanation　of　s6cial　construction　theory，　I　will
introduce　my　stUdy　on　hate　crime　legislations　in　the　United　States　during　the
late　l　990s（Maeshima　2000）．　I　examined　the　legislation　process　of　two
federal　hate　crime　related　legislations：the　Hate　Crime　Statistics　Act　of　l　990
and　the　Hate　Crimes　Sentencing　Enhancement　Act　of　l　994．　The　former　is
the　law　to　gather　data　on　hate　crimes　in　50　states．　It　requires　the　Justice
Department　to　acquire　data　on　crimes　which”manifest　prejudice　based　on
race，　religion，　sexual　orientation，　or　ethnicity”from　law　enfbrcement
agencies　across　the　country　and　to　publish　an　annual　summary　of　the
findings（28　United　State　Code　534）．　The　latter　attempts　to　strengthen
penalties　when　criminals　commit　federal　crimes　whose　motives　were　based
on　hate．　These　were　separate　legislations，　but　later　this　measure　was　enacted
into　a　part　of　the　Violent　Crime　Control　and　Law　Enfbrcement　Act　of　1994．
The　provision　directed　the　United　States　Sentencing　Commission　to　provide
asentencing　enhancement　of”not　less　than　30ffense　levels’　for　offenses　that
the　finder　of　fact　at　trial　determines　beyond　a　reasonable　doubt　are　hate
crimes”（Public　Law　l　O3－222）．　The　two　hate　crime　legislations　intended　to
curb丘ictions　among　di　fferent　racial，　ethnic，　and　religious　groups．　In　a
diverse，　multi－cultural　society，　such　as　the　United　States，　these　laws　have　the
potential　to　act　as　deterrents　against　schisms　and　as　a　catalyst　that　will　bind
people　together．　The　two　legislations　were　enacted；however，　I　argue　that　the
tWo　Acts　are　so　ineffective　that　they　have　been　only　symbolic　rules　to　fight
against　hate　crimes．　Part　of　the　reasons　fbr　the　complications　in　actual
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enforcement　of　the　laws　is　that　there　is　a　grave　issue　yet　to　be　solved　before
the　bills　became　laws．　The　issue　in　question　is　related　to　social　constructed
images　and　ideas　of　a　hate　crime．
　　Hate　crime　is　by　its　nature　socially　constructed，　but　among　socially
constructed　concepts，”hate”is　not　easy　to　conceptualize．　This　is　because
闘hate韓is　rooted　in　each　individuals，　feelings　and　the　definition　of　hatred
varies．　It　is　sometimes　dif行cult　to　distinguish　a　real　hate　crime，　caused　by　a
pure　hatred　toward　a　particular　group，　and　just　law－breaking　conduct　toward
aparticular　person　who　happens　to　be　part　of　the　group．　Thus，　prosecutors
and　law　enfbrcement　officers　encountered　difficulties　in　prosecuting　hate
crime　because　of　the　need　to　identify　hate　and　assess　the　peτpetrator’s　bias　or
prejudice．
　　Another　complication　is　that　the　nuance　of”hate”is　quite　different　in　each
region　of　the　United　States．　Interestingly，　after　the　image　of”a　hate　crime”is
widely　recognized　in　a　particular　area，　the　offense　itself　becomes　more
numerous　in　that　area．　This　is　because　both　the　citizens　and　the　police
became　well　aware　of　the　existence　of　the　nature　of　hate　crime．　However，　it
is　noted　that　the　areas　where　the　image　is　not　socially　established，　the　same
crime　is　not　the　o切ect　of　a　prosecution　or　an　arrest，　or　even　an　investigation．
Thus，　the　data　collected　by　the　mandate　of　the　Statistics　Act　are　far　from
accurate．　Several　states　introduced　various　types　of　state　hate　crime　acts，　but
it　is　common　that　the　details　about　what　constitUtes　a　hate　c曲e　are　quite
different．
　　Comparison　between　the　states　in　the　Northeast　and　states　in　so－called
Deep　South　gives　an　explanation　fbr　different　treatments　of　hate　crime．
Northeastern　states　have　a　larger　number　of　reported　hate　crimes．　The
numbers　of　reported　hate　crimes　in　l　997　in　the　states　of　Massachusetts，
Maryland　were　497　and　335，　respectively．　These　states　are　generally
considered　to　be　sensitive　toward　race　and　ethnic　relations　among　their
residents．　By　contrast，　the　states　in　the　Deep　South，　such　as　Mississippi　or
Alabama，　reported　significantly　small　numbers　of　reported　hate　crime
incidents　during　the　same　year．　In　the　same　year，　Alabama　and　Mississippi
also　reported　zero　hate　crimes，　and　Louisiana　reported　only　five．　Although
racial　and　ethnic　tension　is　much　alleviated丘om　what　once　existed，　these
Southern　states　used　to　be　a　pinnacle　of　racial　inequality．　For　instance，
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Alabama　is　the　state　about　which　Martin　Luther　King　lamented　strong　racial
prejudice　in　his　famous　speech　in　Washington　in　1963．　In　these　Southem
States，”hate　crime”　is　not　sufficiently　socially　recognized（Maeshima　2000，
Federal　Bureau　of　Investigation　l　998）．
C．Social　Construction　Theory　and　Politica1　Communication
　　Social　construction　theory　is　often　adopted　in　the　field　of　political
communication．　Especially，　since　the　1990s，　the　social　construction　of
reality　has　attracted　growing　a廿ention　in　political　communication　research
（see　Tuchman　1978，　Neuman，　Just，　and　Crigler　l　992；Gamson，　Croteau，
Hoynes，　and　Sasson　l　992）．　These　studies　have　fbcused　upon　news　content　as
a　form　through　which　the　mass　media　view　and　perceive　an　event　or　issue，
and　how　they　constme”realities”in　their　production　process．　Using　content
analysis　as　a　method，　these　studies　seek　to　analyze　the　concepts，　categories，
and　ideologies　in　news　selections　and　reporting．　They　suggest　that
”newsworthiness”is　not　a　quality　inherent　in　events，　but　a　negotiated　social
process　between　the　sources　and　newsmakers，　greatly　constrained　by　the
distribution　ofthe　newsmakers　in　time　and　space．　Gaye　Tuchman　argues　that
”news　is　perpetually　defining　and　redefining，　constituting　and　reconstituting
social　phenomena”（1978，184）．
　　Murry　Edelman（1988）claims　that　media　news　accounts　are　not　simply
factUal　presentations，　Rather，　such　accounts　represent　an　interpretation　of　the
day’s　political　facts，　which　are　themselves　interpretations　of　issues，　events，
situations，　and　problems　as　generated　by　interest　groups，　government
officials，　and　elected　representatives　among　others．　According　to　Edelman，
the　mass　media　constnlcts　and　reconstnlcts　the　world　of　public　affairs，　and
political　news　is　arranged　as　a　series　of　dramatic　symbols，　such　as
”enemies，旧’leaders，”and”problems．”Edelman　argues　that　media　accounts
evoke　a　spectacle　that　is　a　construction　by　political　actors，　including　media
organizations　themselves．　Political　roles，　statuses　and　ideologies　are　given
certain　meanings　in　the　media　spectacle．
　　News　selection　and　treatment　are　not　free丘om　values　and　ideology．
Analyzing　the　interaction　betWeen　media　professionals　and　their”sources”in
political　and　state　institutions　is　crucial　fbr　understanding　the　production　of
media　content．　Thus，　one　of　the　typical　ways　of　analyzing　the　media’s　social
71
construction　of　reality　is　to　investigate　the　sources　used　in　the　reporting．
Gamson　suggests　that　the　media　are　likely　to　selectively　omit　several
important　components　of　the　news，　and　that　the　absence　of　certain　facts　can
reveal　a　story　line　that　favors　certain　interests（such　as　industrial　interests
and　bureaucratic　process）which　the　media　are　representing（Gamson　1989，
158）．Sources　are　chosen　based　on”suitability”（Gans　l　979）．　Tuchman
（1978）traces　the　organization　of　the”news－net”through　which　reporters
find　occurrences　to　be　transformed　into　stories；defines　the”web　of　facticity”
that　accepts　information丘om　legitimated　institutions　as”facts，”but　r（）j　ects
the　facticity　of　information丘om　other　sources．　Cohen　et　al．蝕her　point　out
that　social　reality　is　a　media　product　of　the　interaction　between　o切ective
reality　and　a　society響s　own　pragmatic　and　social　needs（Cohen，　Adoni，　and
Bantz　l990）．
　　By　choosing　sources，　news　media　simultaneous　conduct　processes　of
”f『aming．”As　defined　by　Entman（1993），　framing　essentially　involves
salience　and　selection．　Noting　the　power　of丘ames　on　the　public，　Entman
wrote，”Frames　call　attention　to　some　aspects　of　reality　while　obscuring
other　elements，　which　might　lead　audiences　to　have　different　reactions”（55），
Framing　is　one　of　the　crucial　aspects　of　the　media’s　social　constnlction　of
reality；therefbre，　the　constnlction　and　impact　of　media丘ames　have　l）ecome
major　areas　of　research　in　political　communication．　Gitlin（1980）introduced
the　concept　of　framing　to　mass　communication　studies　in　his　classic
examination　of　how　an　American　television　network　trivialized　a　major
student　political　movement　during　the　l　960s．　News　coverage　of　any　social
movement　can　use　a　variety　of丘amillg　strategies．　The　news　can　describe　the
scope　of　the　social　problem，　critique　altemative　proposals　fbr　coping　with
the　problem，　or　detail　the　tactical　moves　of　activists　and　of行cials．　Iyengar
（1991）observed　that　television　news丘ames　issues　in　either　an　episodic　or
thematic　fashion．　Episodic　news　focuses　on　concrete　events　and
personalities．　Thematic　news　puts　events　in　a　larger　social　and　economic
context．　According　to　Iyenger，　television　has　a　need　fbr　simplicity　and
brevity，　and　thus，　episodic　fヒaming　dominates　news　coverage．
　　Another　aspect　of　framing　is　making”story　lines．”Through　framing，
political　elites，　including　the　media，　attempt　to　simplifンacomplex　issue　into
relatively　simple　storyline　and　shape　citizens’political　preferences．　These
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storylines　are　in　nature　reflected　by　the　elites，　definition　about　what　a　public
policy　issue　is　about．　According　to　Gamson　and　Modigliani，　through　this
story　line　making，　political　elites　attempt　to　direct　attention　toward　a
particular　aspect　of　a　public　policy　issue　and，　consequently，　away　from
others．　They　suggest　that　the　fact　that　the　same　basic　story　line　is　repeated　in
so　many　di　fferent　media　is　likely　to　lead　many　people　to　accept　it　as　a
common　point　of　reference（Gamson　and　Modigliani　l　989；Gamson　1992）．
　　The　concept　of　social　construction　is　also　widely　used　not　only　in　political
communication，　but　also　in　public　policy　analysis．　Some　studies　deal　with
social　constructions　as　notion　to　categorize　political　participants，　created　by
social　or　political　strata．　In　Schneider　and　lngram’s　own　definition，’lsocial
construction四is　certain　shared　characteristics　that　connote　a　discrete　social
group　of　positive　or　negative　connotations（Schneider　and　Ingram　1993，
335）．Their　de丘nition　of　social　constmction　fbcuses　on　the　govemment’s
policy　attention，　not　exclusively　on　media．　According　to　Schneider　and
Ingram，　this　definition　of　social　construction　gives　rise　to　a　fbur－cell
classification　scheme　fbr　social　groups．　PowerfUl，　positively　constnlcted
groups　are冒曾advantaged専雪；powerful，　negatively　constructed　groups　are
”contenders”；weak　but　positively　constructed　groups　are　called
”dependentsll；and　the　unfbrtunate　weak　and　negatively　constmcted　groups
are　labeled　as”deviants．”Advantaged　populations　have　considerable
political　power　and　are　positively　constructed　as　meritorious　group．　They
include　scientists，1）usiness，　veterans，　and　the　elderly．”Contenders闘are
groups　that　are　powerfU1，　but　are　constnlcted　as　vocal　and　in　some　cases
greedy　strata　of　society，　such　as　Wall　Street　investors，　savings　and　loan
executives，　big　labor，　and　gay　and　lesbian　activists．”Dependents”1ack
political　power　and　are　constnlcted　as　good　people．　Typical　examples　are
children，　mentally　and　physically　disabled　or　sick　people．”Deviants”are　in
the　worst　situation，　as　they　lack　political　power　and　are　negatively
constructed　as　undeserving，　dangerous，　and　generally’，bad　people・”
Examples　of　deviants　are　criminals，　dnlg　dealers，　flag－bumers，　and　child－
abusers．
　　This　classification　then　explains　how　policies　allocate　burdens　and
benefits　among　target　populations．”Advantaged”groups，　fbr　example，　will
receive　high　benefits，　low　burdens，　and　control　over　agendas　and
73
policymaking．　Deviants，　on　the　other　hand，　get　low　benefits　and　high
burdens・This　fbur－cell　classi且cation　gives　rise　to　potentially　testable
hypotheses　about　policy　outcomes（Schneider　and　lngram　l　993），
II．　Difficulties　in　Understanding　Different　Cultures：Peter　Winchls
Arguments　of　Cultuml　Sensitivities
　　Since　societal　factors　are　one　of　the　major　agents　of　social　construction，
cross－cultural　comparison　may　face　a　very　f血ndamental，　but　difficult
question　about　understanding　different　cuhures．　The　question　is　centered
upon　language　and　its　representation　because　one　cannot　be　sure　if　an
equivalent　concept　or　a　word　exists　in　the　language　being　compared．　Even　if
he　finds　a　similar　concept　or　word　in　the　language，　there　is　a　possibility　that
the　word　may　have　quite　a　different　cultUral　background　and　its　meaning　is
not　always　the　same．　Thus，　it　is　imperative　to　be　sensitive　in　understanding
the　meaning　of　a　word　in　comparison　as　denoted　by　the　specific　cultUre．　A
scholar　who　attempts　to　compare　cultural　artifacts　needs　to　have　a　sensitivity
to　the　culture　of　the　societies　in　which　the　languages　are　used．
A．Peter　Winch°s　Criticism　of　Positivism
　　CultUral　sensitivity　toward　a　different　society　has　been　a　matter　of　heated
discussion．　One　of　the　most　significant　arguments　about　cultural　sensitivity
is　the　Peter　Winch’s　criticism　of　positivism　in　the　social　sciences．　Winch
claims　that　social　science　fails　to　successfUlly　u皿derstand　human　actions　as
long　as　it　employs　the　same　kind　ofjustification　as　the　natural　sciences，　such
as　setting　certain　criteria　to　judge　human　actions　in　other　cultures．　Winch，
whose　analysis　is　based　on　the　work　of　Ludwig　Wittgenstein，　argues　that　we
should　not　see　a　society　through　our　own　pre－set　standards　of　judgment．
Thus，　Winch　suggests　that　the　best　way　to　avoid　misunderstanding　a　society
which　seems　quite　di脆rent丘om　our　own　is　to　try　to　approach　the　society
from　the　inside，　and　that　we　have　to　establish　rational　criteria　that　are
specific　to　that　culture．
　　In　his　seminal　article”Understanding　a　Primitive　Society”（1964），　Winch
explains　the　above－mentioned　argument　by　exemplifンing　E．　E．　Evans－
Pritchard，s　anthropological　study　of　the　mystical　practices　of　the　Azande，　a
”primitive”people　living　in　central　A丘ica（Evans－Pritchard　l　937，1976）．　The
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centerpiece　of　Winch曾s　argument　is　Evans－Pritchard’s　judgment　of　the
Azandels”alien”practices，　such　as　the　influence　of　witchcraft，　the　efficacy
of　magic　medicine，　and　the　role　of　oracles　in　the　Azande　society．
　　Scientific　methods　of　investigation，　such　as　the　Evans－Pritchard　study，
have　shown　conclusively　that　there　are　no　relations　of　cause　and　effect　in　the
beliefs　and　practices　of　the　Azande．　Thus，　Evans－Pritchard　critically
pronounced　that　their　belief　in　the　existence　of　witches　is　false，　magical
medicine　is　illusionary，　and　oracles　are　ineffective．　Winch　claims，　however，
that　this　conclusion　was　not　fair　to　the　Azande　society，　and　that　Evans－
Pritchard　is　crucially　wrong．　This　is　because　of　the　difference　in　the　concept
of　”obj　ective　reality”between　Westem　and　the　Azande　societies．　Winch
elucidates：
Evans－Pritchard　although　he　emphasiZes　that　a　me血ber　of　scientific　culture
has　a　different　conception　of　reality　fbom　that　of　a　Zande　believer　in　magic，
wants　to　go　beyond　merely　registering　this　fact　and　making　the　scientific
conception　agrees　with　what　reality　actually　is　like，　whereas　the　magical
concep廿on　does　not．（308）
　　Winch　challenges　the　philosophy　of　the　social　sciences．　According　to
Winch，　Evans－Pritchard　applies　a　criterion　which　is　appropriate　to　the
evaluation　of　technology　in　relation　to　social　practices，　but　which　do　not
play　a　technological　role　in　the　Azande　society．　Winch　fUrther　finds　Evans－
Pritchard’s　preoccupation　with　a　positivistic　approach　is　the　flaw　in　the
methodology　of　the　social　sciences．　Winch　elucidates　the　dogma　of　the
SOCial　SCienCes：
We　may　ask　whether　a　palticular　scien面c　hypothesis　agrees　with　reality
and　test　this　by　observation　and　experiment．　Given　the　experimental
methods，　and　the　established　use　of　the　theoretical　terms　ente血g　into血e
hypothesis，　then　the　question　whether　it　holds　or　not　is　settled　by　reference　to
something　independent　of　what　I，　or　anybody　else，　care　to　think．　But　the
general　nature　of　the　data　revealed　by　the　exper童ment　can　only　be　specified
in　tems　of　criteria　built　into　the　methods　of　expe血lent　employed　and　these，
in舳，　make　sense　only　to　someone　who　is　conversant　wi舳e㎞d　of
75
scientific　activity　wit止血which　they　are　employed．．．What　Evans－Pritchard
wants　to　be　able　to　say　is　that　the　criteria　applied　in　scientific
experirnentation　consdtute　a　true　lhlk　1）etween　our　ideas　and　an血dependent
reality，　whereas　those　characteristic　of　other　systems　of　thought－一一in
par匝cular，　magical　methodS　of　thought≒－do　not．（309）
　　Winch　holds　that　the　reason　why　a　Western　scholar，　such　as　Evans。
Pritchard，　often　regards　magic　as　an　irrelevant　form　of　technology　is　that　the
scholar　attributes　his　explanations　to　his　own　cultUre．　According　to　Winch，
Western　culture　is　”a　cultUre　whose　conception　of　reality　is　deeply　affected
by　the　achievements　and　methods　of　the　sciences”（307）．
In　order　to　remove　the　stereotypes　derived丘om　our　own　culture，　Winch
suggests　that”the　conception　of，reality，　must　be　applicable　outside　the
context　of　scientific　reasoning．　Although　concept　of　witChcraft，　oracle，　and
magic　in　Westem　culture　is　a　perversion　of　other　orthodox　concq｝ts　both　in
religious　and　scien面c　sense，　it　has，　according　to　Winch，”reality”hl　Zande
culture．　Winch　notes，”A　Zande　would　be　utterly　lost　and　bewildered
舳out　his　oracle．　The　mainstay　of　his　life　would　be　1ackng．　It　is　ra血er　as　if
an　engineer，　in　our　society，　were　asked　to　build　a　bridge　without
mathematical　calculation，　or　a　military　commander　to　mo皿t　an　extensive
coordinated　at伽k　without　the　use　of　clocks．（311）
　　Comparing　them　with　Westem　society，　Winch　suggests　a　different　role　for
”primitive”　practices　in　Zande　life．　Winch　implies　that　Evans－Pritchard　may
underestimate　the　religious　depth　of　traditional　mystical　practices　of　the
Azande．　Winch　sees　Zande　magic，1ike　Christian　prayer，　expresses　certain
attitudes　about　the　contingencies　of　li　fe：
Ido　not　say　that　Zande　magical　rites　are　at　all　like　Christian　prayers　of
supplication　in　the　positive　attitude　to　contingencies　which　they　express．
What　I　do　suggest　is　that　they　are　alike　in　that　they　do，　or　may，　express　an
attitUde　to　contingencies，　rather　than　an　atternpt　to　control　these．（321）
Winch’s　answer　to　the　intelligibility　of　religion　and　of　cross－cultural
76
understanding　is　investing　sui　generic‘language－game，　of　the　society．　This　is
because　language　in　a　society　has　its　own　methods　and　standards　in　its
usage．　In　The　ldea　of　Social　Science（1958）Winch　stresses　the　importance
of　language．　In　Winchls　view，　language　is　not　only　a　tool　of　analysis，　but
also　the　indispensable　access　to　reality．　This　is　because”in　discussing
language　we　are　in飴ct　discussing　what　counts　as　belongs　to　the　world．　Our
idea　of　what　belongs　to　the　realm　of　reality　is　given　fbr　us　in　the　language
we　use”ill－12）．
　　Winch’s　assertions　are　not　completely　free　from　problem．　Arguably，
cultural　relativism　may　hinder　his　view．　However，　it　is　tme　that　cultural
sensitivity　toward　diffヒrent　society　is　a　very　basic　attitude　fbr　a　scholar　of
any　cross－culture－related　field．
B．1）ebates　betWeen　Karl　Popper　and　Thomas　Kuhn，　and　Others
　　It　is　important　to　note　that　Winch’s　work　stands　as　a　landmark　over　the
last　fbur　decades　in　the　argument　with　regard　to　positivism　and　especially　to
its”scientific　methods．”One　of　the　most　famous　and　most　heated
discussions　over　positivism　is　observed　between　Karl　Popper　and　Thomas
Kuhn．　In　his　maj　or　work，　The　Logic　qズ3c∫θη∫哲c　Discovery，　originally
published　in　l　959（2002），　PoPPer　suggests　that　the　principle　of　induction
cannot　be　purely　logical”like　a　tautology　or　an　analytic　statement°’because
inductive　inferences　are　only’1probable　inferences，1（28，29）．　Thus，　PoPPer
argues　that　the　tnle　aim　of　the　scientist　should　not　be　to　prove　hypotheses
true，　but　to　prove　them　f田se．　Through　the　work　of　f田sification，　false
understandings　can　be　systematically　rej　ected．　Falsification　also　requires　a
hypothesis．　According　to　Popper，　knowledge　grows　not　through　simple
observation，　but　through　the　imaginative　formulation　of　a　hypothesis　and　its
test．　Popper　believes　that　falsification　emerges　as　the　point　of　demarcation
between　science　and　non－science，　and　that　only　empirical　tests　can　play　a
role　in　the　development　of　knowledge（57－73）．　In　this　way，　Popper　holds
that　scientific　advancement　is　achieved．　His　doctrine　of　falsifiability　is
important　to　a　post－positivist　view　of　scientific　activity，　and　it　has　a
particularly　noticeable　influence　on　research　methods　in　the　social　sciences，
including　Political　science．
　　Although　Popper　rejects　simple　inductivism　in　science，　his　assertion　is
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based　on　traditional　views　of　positivism（or　so－called　post－positivism）in
comparison　with　Kuhn（Fuller　2004；Ruddock，26－36，2001）．　Like　other
positivists，　PoPPer　believes　that　since　truth　exists鯉out　there，lg　and　that　it　is
available　upon　which　to　base　to　a　genuine　scientific　theo】写，　if　approached
correctly．　In　his　maj　or　work，　The　Structure（）f　Scientitic　Revolutions（1962，
1996），Kuhn　suggests，　however，　scienti五c　advancement　does　not　occur　the
way　Popper　explains　it，　but　results　from　a　series　of　paradigm　shifts．　Ku㎞
argues　that　scientific　advancement　is　not　evolutionary，　but　rather　is　a”series
of　peacefUl　interludes　punctuated　by　intellectually　violent　revolutions，闘and
in　those　revolutions，’one　conceptual　world　view　is　replaced　by　another，1
（10）．Instead　of　seeing　the　history　of　science　as　a　natural　progression　towards
ultimate　truth，　Kuhn　regards　it　as　a　long　series　of　conflicts　betWeen　different
and　competing　ways　to　process　data　and　explain　results．　The　transformations
resulting　from　the　conflicts　are　gradual　as　old　beliefs　are　replaced　by　the　new
paradigms　creating”a　new　gestalt”（112）．
　　With　regard　to　the　theory　of　a　paradigm，　there　is　a　parallel　between　Winch
and　Kuhn．　There　is　a　clear　resemblance　in　Winch　and　Kuhn’s　views　about
societal　impact　on　the　formation　of　a　concept．　Winch　illustrates　with　the
conceptual　development　of　the”theory　of　disease．”Winch　argues　this
development：
血volved　the　adoption　of　new　ways　of　do童ng　things　by　people　involved，　hl
one　way　or　another，　in　medical　practice．　An　account　of　the　way　in　which
social　relations　in　the　medical　profession　had　been　influenced　by　this　new
concept　would　include｛am　account　of　what　that　concept　was．　Conversely，　t　le
concept　itself　is　unintelligible　apart丘om　its　relations　to　medical　practice
（Winch　1958，122）．
　　Just　as　Popper’s　idea　of　falsifiability　has　wielded　a　huge　influence　on
research　methods，　Winch－Kuhn’s　notion　of　scientific　development　affected
many　sCholars　about　how　to　conduct　research．　Many　scholars，　both　in　the
social　sciences　and　humanities，　have　fbllowed　strikingly　similar　approaches
to　that　of　Winch．　Especially　in　the丘eld　of　cultural　anthropology，　many
studies　are　conducted　fヒom　viewpoints　similar　to　Winch’s．　One　example　is　a
series　of　studies　by　Clif｛brd　Geertz．　Geertz’s　famous　observation　of　a
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Balinese　cock　fight　is　based　on　the　investigation　of　the冒language－game’of
the　society　that　Winch　emphasizes　the　importance　of（Geertz　1972）．　In　order
to　properly　understand　the　cultural　importance　of　the　Balinese　cockfights，　it
was　essential　fbr　Geertz　to　become　more　of　a　part　of　the　Balinese　culture．
According　to　Geertz，　the　only　way　to　understand　the　meanings　of　various
expressive　fbrms　is　to　observe　them　in　a　particular　context．　Using　this
methodology，　Geertz　finds　the　cockfights’vital　meanings　fbr　the　Balinese．
For　example，　cockfights　are　well　attended　events　by　men　only，　which　is
significant　to　their　notion　of　masculinity．　Also，　bets　are　taken　on　these
events，　although　the　money　isn’t　all　that　is　at　stake．　Further，　Geertz　discovers
Balinese　conceptions　of　the　State　and　divinity　based　on　the　cockfight．　Geertz
concludes　that　the　fight　is　a　central　symbolical　stnlcture　of　the　Balinese
SOClety・
　　In　the　field　of　social　science，　several　research　methodologies，　mainly
qualitative　methodologies，　fbllows　the　notion　of　a　scientific　development
advocated　by　Winch　and　Kuhn’s．　One　of　those　most　typical　research
methods　that　emphasizes　Winch－Kuhn’s　notion　of　scientific　development　is
participant　observation．　Participant　observation　is　a　popular　and　widely　used
research　method　and　requires　close　involvement　with　a　given　group　of
individuals　and　observation　of　their　activities　in　their　natural　environment．
An　observer　should　immerse　his／herself　in　the　culture　of　a　given　society　as
fUlly　as　possible　over　extended　periods　of　time．　Participant　observation
originated　in　cultural　anthropology，　but　because　of　its　recognized　validity，
social　scientists，　including　political　scientists，　use　the　same　method．　An
example　of　participant　observation　in　contemporary　political　science　is　a
seminal　study　of　Richard　Fenno．　Fenno　has　stUdied　members　of　Congress　by
fbllowing　them　around　on　their　visits　to　their　states　and　districts，　and　trying
to　blend　in　with　the　members’environments（Fenno　1978）．　Fenno’s
description　of　his　work　as・”soaking　and　poking”（Fenno　l　978，249）has
became　synonymous　with　this　style　of　research．　Many　political　scientists，
such　as　James　Glaser，　who　undertook　participant　observations　have　utilized
some　of　the　lessons丘om　Fenno’s　projects，　such　as　the　know－hows　of
establishing　and　developing　rapport，　and　keeping　intellectual　distance丘om
the　obj　ect　observed（Femo　1978，1990；Glaser　1996）．
79
III．　Difficulty　in　lnvestigating　the　Meaning　of　the　Word”Evi1”between
Cultures
　　As　discussed　in　the　previous　section，　the　debate　over　positivism　is　deeply
rooted　in　the　dif猛culties　of　understanding　different　cul抽res．　The　discussion
requires　a　scholar　of　any　cross－culture　related　fields　to　be　sensitive　toward
different　cultures．　Cross－culture　investigation　by　comparing　the　same　word
or　concept　especially　poses　another　complexity．　This　is　because　the　same
word　may　sometimes　have　different　connotations　in　different　cultures，　even
if　its　denotative　meaning　is　similar．　In　order　to　fUrther　explore　the　sensitivity
of　cultures，　this　section　exemplifies　different　accounts　of　the　notion　of”evil”
in　the　Westem　world　and　in　East　Asia．
　　The　word”evil”has　a　very　strong　connotation　in　the　Westem　world．　This
is　because　Westem　culture　is　rooted　in　Christianity．　In　Westem　culture，
practicing　Christianity　and　leading　a　daily　life　based　on　the　Christian　ideal　is
considered”good．”Typical　Christian　rules，　such　as　Ten　Commandments　and
avoiding　the　Seven　Sins　teach　their　believers　to　be　a”good四1）eing　under
God．　In　Christianity，　the　antonym　of　the　word”good．°l　is，　of　course，”evil．”
An　aberrant　act　from”goodness”is　believed　to　be　an”evil”deed．　Thus，
’，?魔奄戟his　a　detestable　concept，　and　an脾evil’1　deed　is　an　act　of　aberration
which　must　be　avoided　in　the　Westem　World（Arellano　2004）．
　　These　concepts　about”evil”may　be　difficult　to　translate　into　Asian
cultures．　Compared　with　Western　ideas，　the　East　Asian　concept　of　its
”evilness”may　not　have　a　strong　religious　connotation．　This　is　partly
because　East　Asian　countries　have　a　tradition　of　polytheism　or　henotheism．
Polytheistic　or　henotheistic　religious　traditions　are　widely　spread　throughout
the　regions　of　East　Asia。　Buddhism　and　ConfUcianism，　the　two　most　widely
accepted　religious　traditions　in　East　Asia，　are　considered　very　inclusive　in
their　beliefs，　as　opposed　to　the”mutually－exclusive，　either－or　values”of
monotheistic　tradition（Kunihiro　2006）．　In　addition　to　the　two　religions，
other　local　polytheistic　religious　traditions，　such　as　Shintonism　in　Japan　and
Shamanism　in　Korea，　have　provided　historically　agnostic　cultural
background．　Unlike　monotheistic　religions，　such　as　Christianity　and　Islam，
polytheism　acknowledges　multiple　gods　and　divinities，　and”the　good”acts
are　relative．　In　polytheistic　cultures，　the　dichotomy”good－versus－evil”acts
tend　to　be　blurred　because　people，s　belief　system　is　more　likely　to　accept　the
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relativity　of”evilness曾曾（Hawkins　2003；Ooms　1988；Bellah　l　957）．
　　C．Fred　Alfbrd（1999）examines　Korean　society　where　there　is　no　word
that　equates　to　the　Westem　te㎜”evil．’曹Alford　questions　whether　there　is　a
society　without”evilll　and　how　such　a　society　sees　human　nature．　He
searched　fbr　answers　in　Korea　by　interviewing　two－hundred　and　fifty
Koreans，　including　thirteen　Korean　Americans．　The　interviewees　consisted
of　a　wide　range　of　citizens，　chosen　f士om　an　economic，　political，　religious，
and　demographic　cross－section　of　Korea．　The　questions　in　the　interviews　are
about　their　views　on　evilness，　the　self，　and　globalization．　He　also　asked
college　students　to　write　an　essay　about　the　same　questions．　Alfbrd　talked－－
and　sometimes　ate　and　drank　as　well－with　interviewees　and　actUally　found
that　the　nonexistence　of　evil　in　Korea．　The　interviews　reveals　that　his　initial
hypothesis　that”evil　would　be　divided　into　different　areas　of　life　governed
by　different　religious　principles”（89）was　rej　ected．
　　Alfbrd　argues　that　Koreans　regard　evil　not　as　a　moral　category　but　as　an
intellectual　one．　Alfbrd　explains　his　views：”I　do　not　imagine　that　I　have
explained　the　Korean　view　of　evil．　Rather，　I　have　mapped　its　absence．　This
map　is　fundamentally　a　Western　overlay，　showing　where　East　does　not
match　West．　It　is　all　I　could　do，　all　any　Westemer　can　do，　I　believe．　The
trick　is　to　know　it”（7）．　Alford　also　discovers　the　Koreans「　sentiment　that
evil　results　ffom　the　creation　of　dualisms，　oppositions　between　people　and
ideas，　and　that　the　content　of　the　Korean　view　of　evil　is”the　fear　of　absolute
otherness　and　difference”（12）．　Interestingly，　this　fear　is　not　the　fear　of　the
other　as　the　Westem　views　it，　but　the　Korean　versiori　of　the　fear　is”the　fear
of　becoming　other　to　oneself’（12）．　Alfbrd　also　finds　in　the　mind　of　Koreans
that　the　real　evil　is鴨the　evil　that　cannot　be　spoken：unrelatedness，　the　dread
of　absolute　alienation　and　unconnectedness，　pure　loneliness，　absolute
difference”（ll）．
　　Alfbrd　concludes　that　evil　cannot　exist　in　Korea　because”Korean　have
created　a　universe　in　which　there　is　no　place　fbr　it．．．the　Korean　ak　and
choe　are　not　really　about　evil　at　all”（89）．　The　absence　of　evil　is　explained　by
Koreans，　sentiment　toward　themselves　and　social　relationship　with　other．
Alfbrd　maintains　that　in　Korean　such　values　as　chong（affection），　han
（suffering），　and耐わ〃御（mood）are　held　together　in　the　tightly　woven　social
networks；thus；social　relationship　is　itself”the　standpoint　ofjudgement”（94）
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for　Koreans．　At　the　same　time，　Koreans　have　a　concept　of　uri（we）which
shows　loose　boundaries　between　the　self　and　the　group－self　Similar　to　this
point　is　that　what　Koreans　fear　most　is　isolation　from　the　group－self　and
social　values　associated　with　it．　Alfbrd　argues　that　Koreans　are　very　anxious
about　domination　by　individuals　because　it　is　against　their　social
relationships．
　　Since　the　interviews　were　conducted　immediately　befbre　and　after　the
economic　collapse　of　December　l　997，　AIfbrd　also　fbund　an　intriguing　fact
that　related　to　Koreans，　account　fbr　evil．　Alfbrd　discovered　that　Koreansl
responses　to　globalization　matched　Westemers’views　about　evil．　Alfbrd
argues　that　globalization　threatens　to　create　a　world”in　which　Koreans　no
longer　recognize　themselves，　in　which　Koreans　are　other　to　themselves”（12），
Globalization（segγehawのto　Koreans　is　evil　because　it　is　fbr　Koreans　a
great　failure　of　the　economy　which　also　isolates　individuals　from　close
social　relationships．　Globalization　represents”the　dangers　of　atomization，
islolation，丘agmentation　and　loss，　tuming　Koreans　into　strangers　in　their
own　world”（145）．　Thus，　Alfbrd　suggests　that　globalization　is”what　Korean
most　fears，　becoming　alien　to　themselves，　living　in　a　world　of　pure
othemess”（155）．
　　The　Japanese　society　may　share　very　similar　views　on”evilness”with
South　Koreans，　and　the　Japanese　also　have　different　concept　on　evilness
from　the　Western　nations．　This　is　because　of　the　cultural　resemblance
between　Korea　and　Japan．　Just　like　Korea，　eclectic　mixtures　of　religion　are
co－existing　in　Japan　as　welL　For　Japanese　people，　good－versus－evil
dichotomy　is　sometimes　blured，　compared　with　Western　nations　whose
dominant　culture　root　is　in　Christianity，　and　the　word”evi1”is　quite　a
relative　and　nuanced　te㎜．
1V．　The　Different　Notion　of　”evil”　in　the　War　in　lraq　betWeen　the　US
and　J叩anese　Media：The　Content　Analysis　of　Editorials
　　As　an　illustration　of　the　different　accounts　of”evilness，”this　section
compares　American（theハTew　York　Ti〃1es）and　Japanese（the．Asahi）maj　or
print　media　organizations’editorials　during　the　period　of　actual　combat　of
the　Iraq　War（from　March　20，2003　to　May　1，2003）．　I　have　already
published　two　related　works，　both　of　which　employed　content　analysis
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methodology　of　the　two　print　media．　One　is　about　content　analysis　in　the
two　papers　during　the　nln－up　period　of　the　war（from　October　1，2002　to
March　l　9，2003）．　This　study　fbund　that　the　two　allies’media　have　quite
distinctive　treatments　of　the　war，　especially　their　rationalization　of　the　cause
of　the　Iraq　War，　the　role　and　the　power　of　the　United　Nations　in　relation　to
the　war，　and　the　degree　of　intensity　in　the　coverage　of　civilian　causalities
and　anti－war　movements，　among　other　things（Maeshima　2006a）．　The　other
specifically　fbcuses　on　the　news　written　bジembedded　j　oumalists”during
the　actual　battle（丘om　March　20，2003　to　May　1，2003）．　This　research
concluded　that　in　the　two　papers’”embedded　joumalists”produced　articles
tllat　are　sometimes　similar　in　their　personal　and　realistic　descriptions　and　in
their　fbcus　on　daily　activities　in　the　field．　Nonetheless，　there　are　significant
disparities　in　their　fbrmats　and　degree　of　sympathy　they　have　with　the
coalition　fbrces（Maeshima　2006b）．　Both　previous　studies　suggest　that　even
the　same　or　similar　phenomenon　is　sometimes　quite　differently　portrayed　by
the　two　media．　Based　on　these　findings，1　will　argue　that　different　notions　of
evil　in　the　two　papers’editorials　account　fbr　the　core　of　their　difference　in
their　coverage　of　the　War．
A．Research　Design
　　This　section　qualitatively　compares　typical　editorials　of　the　Asahi　and　the
ハrew　York　Times，　written　in　almost　similar　periods　of　the　Iraq　War．　The
editorials　to　compare　are：（1）immediately　a丘er　the　launch　of　the　War
（March　20）；（2）ten　days　after　the　War　was　initiated（March　31）；（3）The
血ll　of　Baghdad（April　9）；（3）President　Bush’s”mission　accomplished”
speech（April　30）．　Editorials　are　the　most　visible　outlets　of　the　political
position　of　a　newspaper．　These　editorials　express　fUndamental　differences　of
the　two　leading　newspapers．　Research　question　is　whether　the　papers’
characterizations　on”evi1”may　differ，　even　when　both　papers　reported　the
same　or　similar　news．　In　other　words，　differences　may　be　fbund　in　the　way
they　construct”realities”on　evilness　over　the　Iraq　War．　After　presenting
major　finding　of　the　comparisons（subsection　B），　detailed　illustrations　will
be　explained　by　using　both　papers’　editorials　immediately　after　the　launch　of
the　War（subsection　C）and　on　the　fall　ofBaghdad（Subsection　D）．
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B．Major　Findings
　　The　two　print　media　portrayed　the　War　in　lraq　quite　differently．　The
biggeat　difference　in　the　results　of　the　content　analysis　is　that　the　two
leading　liberal　papers　hove　constructed　different四evildoers．”
1）The　Asahi
　　Contrary　to　the．〈［ew｝”ork　Times，　the．Asahi　depicts　America　as　the　bigger
”evi1曾曾who　initiated　an　ungrounded　war．　Also，　the．Asahi　indicates　that　the
United　Nations　is　the　organization　to　halt　the”American　invasion．”Unlike
theハ「ew　y∂rk　Times，　French　actions　over　the　Iraq　War　are，　in伽オ5醐，
noble．　In　the　paper，　America’s　evilness　is　more　conspicuous　than　that　of
Hussein
In　every　editorial，　the　Asahi　firmly　suggests　that　the　US　action　to　start　the
war　is　wrong　and　that　US　attacks　into　lraq　are　immoral　acts　of　invasions．　It
is　noticeable　that　Asahi’s　responses　to　the　war　in　h・aq　matched　Westemers’
views　about”evil”in　Christian　terminology．　It　seems　that　the　Asahi　believes
that　any　actions　to　start　a　war　are　the　worst　and　most　sinful　action　of
humankind．　This　is　because　many　innocent　lives　are　lost　and　the　life　of　their
families．are　destroyed　in　any　given　war．　Also，　President　Bush’s”us　vs．　them”
and”good　vs．　evi1”dualism　are　parts　of　Asahi’s　criticism　because　anyone－
even　those　who　with　a　decent　cause－一一start　an　actual　battle　is”evil層’fbr　the
editors　in　the／lsahi．　The．Asahi　seems　to　define　that　evil　as　the　US　side
which　committed　a　sin　for　the　peace　of　the　world　by　initiating　the　War．
2）　Theハ「ew　yヒ）rk　Times
　　Theハlew　York　Ti〃1es　portrays　Saddam　Hussein　as　the　personification　of
”evil”In　the　newspaper，　Hussein　has　supported　terrorists’activities　and
tomlented　Iraqi　citizens　who　want　to　have　freedom．　Indeed，　Hussein　is　the
America’s　archenemy　in　the　stories　of　theハrew　y∂rk　Times．　The　paper
repeatedly　indicates　that　the　United　Nations　is　a　powerless　organization
which　camot　stop　the　Hussein’s　plot．　French　opposition　is　one　of　the　main
reasons　why　the　US　was　not　able　to　obtain　a　fUll　support　from　the　United
nations・Thus，　a　series　of　French　actions　are　also　portrayed　rather　negatively
in　theハlew　York　Ti〃zes．
　　While伽1悔w｝lork　Times　treated　the　War　as　a　hasty　invasion　without
UN　mandate，　the　paper’s　editorials　sometimes　shed　light　on　the　aspects　of
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”liberating　Iraq　from　Saddam　Hussein，s　despotic　regime．’°Also，　the　paper
well　explained　the　importance　of　ousting　Hussein　fbr　the　sake　of　American
national　security　and　peace　in　the　Middle　East　countries．　Furthermore，’乃θ
ハIYT　devoted　a　relatively　large　portion　of　its　editorials　on　the　daily　activities
of　the　coalition　fbrces，　consisting　mostly　of　US　and　UK　fbrces．
　　Along　with　their　strategies　and　actions，　their　daily　lives　are　fUlly　depicted．
These　articles　include　anything　from　mundane　chores，　such　as　the　way　to　dig
afbxhole　and　to　eat　and　sleep　in　the　desert，　to　their　relationship　with
colleagues，　and　to　the　families　they　left　at　home．　AIso，　there　are　numbers　of
editorials　which　referred　to　the　interactions　with　local　residents　which　the
coalition　fbrces”liberated”These　articles　provide　an　image　that　indicates
that　the”common　people　like　us”extend　their　effbrt　to　save　the　innocent
people　who　were　”suffering丘om　the　tyrant　regime．’曾
　　By　contrast　with　Asahi，　it　appears　that　the　NYT　regards　the　threat　to
intemational　security　is，’evil”in　Christian　sense．　Thus，　Saddam　Hussein，　the
despotic　leader　who　might　have　weapons　of　mass　destructions　is　an
”evildoer．”Although　both　papersl　notion　of　evil　gravitate　around　the
possibility　to　endanger　a　number　of　people，　the　Asahi　fbcuses　more　on　the
action　of　killing　and　the　N｝T　pays　more　attention　on　the　prevention　of
massive　killing．
C．The　Editorials　of　Both　Papers　on　the　Beginning　of　the　lraq　War
　　As　an　illustration　of　the　above－mentioned　findings，　the　editorials　of　both
papers　on　immediately　after　the　launch　of　the　War　need　to　be　thoroughly
explored．
1）1乃θ・4sahi
　　Regarding　the　Iraq　War，’乃θオ5α痂has　been　unequivocally　anti－war．　In　the
editorial　immediately　after　the　beginning　of　the　lraq　War，翻励l　declared
a五㎜opposition　to　the　War．　This　is　because　the　paper　seems　to　believe　that
the　military　action　intervention　was　preventable．　The　editorial　on　March　22，
2003is　titled”End　the　conflict　swi負ly：The　21st　Century’s　War　Must　not　be
Religious　War．”This　article　suggests：”Even　when　it　was　still　possible　to
eliminate　Iraq’s　weapons　of　mass　destnlction　short　of　resort　to　military
intervention，　the　Bush　administration　chose　to　use　fbrce，　despite　widespread
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opposition　to　war．　We　do　not　support　this　war．”The　Asahi　disapproves　of
the　US　policies　choice　to　use　fbrce　because”it　was　still　possible　to　eliminate
Iraqgs　weapons　of　mass　destnlction　short　of　resort　to　military　intervention．”
　　77ie　Asahi’s　maj　or　concern　that　any　conflict　must　be　avoid　seems　to　have
originated　f｝om　the　fact　that　damages　of　lraqi　civilians　are　huge　because”in
any　conflict，　those　who　suffer　most　are　those　who　are　mled，　not　those　who
nlle”and，，many　people，　civilian　and　military，　are　being　killed　or　wounded
and　property　is　being　destroyed．”The　editorial　suggests　that　minimizing
civilian　casualties　is　a　practical　solution　even　a丘er　the　War　was　initiated．
The　editorial　asserts　that：”considering　the　realities［of　the　fact　that　the　War
was　started　even　if　the　paper　has　been　strongly　opposed］，　the　next　challenge
is　to　detem血e　what　course　would　be　best　fbr　the　people　of　Iraq　and　the
world．　Above　al1，　the　challenge　is　to　bring　the　war　to　a　swift　conclusion　with
minimal　casualties．”According　to　the　article，　the　best　practical　measure　after
the　launch　of　the　War　is　a　swift　conclusion　with　minimal　casualties，
　　For　the　welfare　of　Iraqi　citizens，　the　paper　hopes　US　and　British　military
strategies　should　be　citizen一丘iendly．　According　to　the　Asahi，　the　attacks
must　be”narrowly　fbcused　upon　military　targets　and　facilities　related　to
weapons　of　mass　destmction”and　must　not　use　hugely　destmctive　new
weapons，　as　was　the　case”during　NATO　air　strikes　upon　Yugoslavia　or　in
the　U．S．－initiated　assault　upon　terrorist　targets　in　Afghanistan．”At　the　same
time，　the　Asahi　demands　that　Saddam　Hussein　not　to　sacrifice　the　people　of
Iraq　fbr　his　own　honor　and　especially　claims　that　employing　chemical　and
biological　weapons　never　be　allowed．
　　The！lsahi　fUrther　notes　the　importance　of　offering　assistance　to　the　people
of　Iraq．　The　paper　asserts：
The　United　Nations　anticipates　l　O　million　people　will　be　short　of　fbod
withi　1　six　weeks．　The　United　States　is　said　to　be　committed　to　continue　to
provide　fbod　and　medical　supphes．　We　hope　arrangementS　will　be　made　as
soon　as　possible　to　provide　humanitarian　assistance　to　the　people　of　lraq
丘om血e　international　community．　The　flood　of　refUgees　can　be　expected　to
be　significant．　The　Uhited　States　and　Britain　should　do　their　best　to　secure
仕Le　safety　of　the　refUgees，血cooperation　with　Iraq’s　neighbors．
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　　The／Asahi’s　basic　assertion　has　been　that　the　United　States　should　dictate
the　Iraq　issues　even　when　the　War　had　already　been　started．　This　editorial
put　an　emphasis　on　the　role　of　the　United　Nations’rebuilding　efforts　in
postwar　Iraq．　Since　it　is　not　easy　to　maintain　peace　in　postwar　Iraq　because
of　ethnic　and　religious　complications，　the　editorial　predicts　that　it　is　”next　to
impossible”fbr　the　United　States　to　stabilize　Iraq　without　the　assistance　of
the　United　Nations　and　other　countries．　The　article　elucidates：
ln　the　United　Nations　Security　Council　meeting　just　before　the　start　of　the
war，　which　the　American　and　British　f（）reign　mmisters　chose　not　to　atten¢
their　counterparts　in　France，　Germany　and　other　countries　opposed　to　the
war　expressed　their　readiness　to　provide　cooperation　and　humanitarian
assistance　in　lraq　after　the　war，　even　though　they　criticiZed　Washngton　for
the　war　itself　We　hope　those　nations　and　U．N．　Secretary－General　Kofi
Annan　will　pursue　diplomacy　toward　end㎞g　the　war　quickly．
　　The　editorial　juxtaposes　televised　statement　of　President　George　W・Bush
with　that　of　Saddam　Hussein，　noting　the　somewhat　detached　way　that　the
two　leaders”presented　their　causes　in　televised　statements．”The　tone　of　the
article　is，　however，　more　disapproving　of　the　US　situation：”In　the　48－hour
countdown　to　the　start　ofhostilities，　American　television　networks　broadcast
the　unfblding　pre－war　developments．　The　war　being　waged　by　the　United
States　is　evolving　as　if　it　were　some　sort　of　game．”
　　An　interesting　finding　is　that　the．Asahi　suggests　the　root　cause　of　the　Iraq
War．　It　seems　to　believe　that　possibly　a　maj　or　reason　for　the　conflict　can　be
attributed　to　the　difference　in　religions　and　cultures．　In　this　editoria1，　the
Asahi　analyzes　that　Christian”good　and　evil”dichotomy　that　lies　at　the　basis
ofthe　Bush’s　decision　on　Iraq：
The　phrase”Arab　world”also　tums　up　in　many　references　in　Saddam
Husse元n’s　address．　He　said　the　Arab　world　is　a　source　of　dignity，　and　added，
”Long　live　the　Arab　world．”And，　he　said，　since　Bush　has　made　this
American－initiated　war　a　conflict　directed　at　the　whole　Arab　and　Islamic
world，　the　Arab　people　would　rise　up　in　a　j　ihad（holy　war）．　Since　the　conflict
began，　the　Arab　and　Islamic　nations　have　come　to　regard　the　role　of
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American　and　British　troops　as　a　revival　of　the　Crusades　of　the　Middle
Ages．　Some　lslamic　leaders　even　go　so　far　as　to　call　for　a’jihad　against　the
infidels．”The　concepts　of　good　and　evil　that　President　George　W．　Bush
ascribes　to　are　said　to　be　heavily　influenced　by血ndalnentalist　Chrisdanity．
The　fact　that　Bush　often　quotes血e　Bible　in　his　addresses　only　adds　to　the
credibility　of　that　observation．　Bush　is　also　the　president　who　likened　war　ill
Afghanistan　to　the　Crusades．　Othcials　ofhis　admh盛stradon　do　not　hesitate　to
speak　of　democratiZation　in　the　nations　of　the　Middle　East　as　if　to　ignore　the
cultures　and　traditions　ofthe　Arab　world．
　　Christians　and　Islam　discord　is　a　familiar　concept　for　political　scientists．
The　Asahi　argues　the　prime　mover　of　the　conflict　is”The　Clash　of
Civilizations．”This　notion　is　proposed　by　Samuel　Huntington　during　1990s．
The　editorial　continues：
Samuel　Huntington，　the　noted　U　S．　political　scientist，　noted　that　with　the　end
ofthe　Cold　War，　there　would　be　a　clash　of　civilizations　of　Christianity，　Islam
and　other　religions．　The　Middle　East　is　already　afnicted　with　the㎜esolved
problems　of　the　fate　of　the　Palestinians　in　a　dispute　that　stems　1argely　from
religious　discord．　Dependmg　upon　how　the　war　develops，　there　is　a　danger　it
will　aggravate　the　clash　of　civilizations．
　　Thus，　the　conclusion　of　the　editorial　is　that　the　Iraq　War　must　not　be
shaped　as　a　religious　conf【ict　caused　by　the　abhorrence　of　other　religions：
The　Asah’quotes　a　part　of　George　H．　W．　Bush’s　memoir　and　implies　that　the
current　president’s魚ther　had　endeavored　not　to仕ame　the　First　Gulf　War　as
areligious　confヒontation　between　the　West　and　the　Islam　world　and釦rther
a「gues：
Pope　John　Paul　ll　has　pleaded　for　peace血1　resolution　of　the　lraqi　problem，
and　other　Christian　leaders　have　expressed　s㎞ilar　concerns　of　a　clash　of
ciViliZations．　In　his　address　announcing　the　start　of　war　agahlst　Iraq，　Bush
said　he　would　pay”due　respect　fbr　its　cittzens，　fbr　their　great　civilセation　and
for　the　religious　faiths　they　practice．”We　hope　he　will　clearly　remember
what　he　has　said．　War　at　the　beginning　of　the　21st　cent皿y　must　not　become
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areligious　conflict．
2）The　New　York　Ti〃1es
　　On　the　beginning　of　War，　the　NYT　canied　tWo　editorials　consecutively　for
two　days．　One　seems　to　be　written　simultaneously　with　the　launch　of　the
conflict（”The　War　Begins，”March　20，2003），　while　the　other　is　about　the
initial　progress　of　the　War（”How　to　Watch　the　War，”March　21，2003）．　The
editorials　of　theハle・w・York　1『imes　clearly　present　a　di脆rent　perspective　of
the　Iraq　War．　While　the　Asahi　stresses　the　importance　of　the　lives　of　lraqi
civilians　and　exclude　the　concems　of　those　in　the　United　States　and　British
fbrces，　the　1＞YT　attempts　to　care　fbr　both．　From　the　context，　the　N｝T　put
emphasis　on　the　safety　of　the　American　military．
No　one　who　knows　the　American　military　doubtS　that　it　will　do　itS　job　to　the
best　of　its　ability　and　with　an　unswerving　consciousness　of　the　balance
between　oppo血mity　and　risk．　The　lives　wagered　in　this　operation　belong　to
young　Americans｛and　to　lraqis　of　all　ages．　Perhaps　no　mili伽y　has　ever
known　as　well　as　this　one　how　important　it　is　to　have　a　care　for　those　lives．
　　While　the　Asahi　does　not　touch　upon　strategies　or　new　developments　in
the　military，　the　NYT　points　out　the　goal　of　the　mission　and　the　latest
advancements　in　military　technology，　especially　as　a　comparison　with　the
first　Gulf　War：
Many　Americans　remember　the　first　gulf　war　all　too　vividly，　and　the
temptation　will　be　to　read　this　war　against　the　backdrop　of　that　one．　The
terrain　is　the　same，　but　everything　else　has　changed．　A　military　thaち　even　a
dozen　years　ago，　still　f（）und　itSelf　shuttling　paper　battle　orders　back　and　fbrth
is　now　electronically　linked　and　coordinated　in　ways　that　would　have
seemed　unimaginable　then．　There　is　no　strategic　eXit　in　the　oMng，　as　there
was　when　the　coalition　forces　stopped　well　short　of　Baghdad　in　l　991．Now
it　is　Saddar【l　or　nothing．
　　Whereas　the　Asahi　presents　a　clear　oPPosition　to　the　War，　the　？＞YT
position　is　somewhat　ambivalent．　This　is　partly　because　the　1＞YT　has
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asserted　that　the　war　should　be　undertaken　only　with　broad　international
support．　Also，　its　ambivalence　is　reflected　of　huge　supportive　sentiments　for
the　military　action　since　the　scars　of　the　911terrorists，　attacks　were　still
vivid　fbr　many　Americans．
Our　job　here　is　not　as　transcendently　clear　as止e　soldiers’job．　Now　that　the
first　strikes　have　begしm，　even　those　who　vehemently　opposed　this　war　will
find　themselves　in　the　strange　POsition　of　hoping　for　just　what　the　president
they　have　oPPosed　is　hhnself　hoping　fbr：aquick，　conclusive　resolution
f（）ught　as　bloodlessly　as　possible．　People　who　have　supported　Mr．　Bush　all
along　may　feel　tempted　to　t【y　to　silence　those　who　voice　dissent．．．．If　things
go　as　well　as　we　hope，　even　those　who　sharply　disagree　with　the　logic
behnd　this　war　are　1ikely　to　end　up　feeli皿g　reassure¢　almost　against　their
will，　by　the　successfU1　proj°ection　of　American　power．　Whether　they　felt　the
idea　ofwar　in　ltaq　was　a　bad　one　from　the　beginning，　or－－like　us－－they　felt
it　should　be　undertaken　only　With　broad　i皿ernational　support，　the　yeaming
to　go　back　to　a　time　when　we　felt　in　control　of　our　own　des血y　shll㎜s
strong．　Of　all　the　reasons　fbr　this　mission，　the　unspoken　one，　deepest　and
most　hopeless，　is　to　erase　Sept，1　1　from　our　hearts．
　　The　conclusion　of’乃θ1V｝xT’s　editorial　is　vague，　compared　with　the　Asahi．
The　2＞｝T　suggests　only　that　debate　over　what　comes　next　is　imperative
because”we　have　scarcely　begun　to　talk　about　how　it　should　be
accomplished．”The　paper　claims：
As　a　nation　we　have　scarcely　begun　to　talk　about　how　it　should　be
accomplished．　Even　as　we　sit　here　at　home，　wonying　about　the　outcome　of
the　fighting，　we　must　start　to　debate　what　comes　next．　That　public　discussion
has　to　start　soon，　even　tomorrow．　But　f（）r　now，　all　our　other　thoughts　have
come　to　rest．　We　simply　hope　for　the　welfare　of　those　men　and　women　一一
sons　and　daughters－－who　will　be　flinging　themselves　into　the　lraqi　desert．
　　The　editorial　juxtaposes　televised　statement　of　President　George　W．　Bush
with　that　of　Saddam　Hussein，　noting　the　somewhat　detached　way　that　the
two　leaders”presented　their　causes　in　televised　statements．”The　tone　of　the
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article　is，　however，　very　cynical．　It　states”in　the　48－hour　countdown　to　the
start　of　hostilities，　American　television　networks　broadcast　the　unfblding
pre－war　developments．　The　war　being　waged　by　the　United　States　is
evolving　as　if　it　were　some　sort　of　game．”
　　In　the　next　editorial　after　the　initial　attack，　the　？＞YT’s　position　on　the　War
becomes　more　noticeable．　The　editorial　is　very　supportive　fbr　the　American
actions　in　Iraq（”How　to　Watch　the　War，”March　21，2003）．　The　tone　of　the
editorial　is　almost　j　ingoistic　qs　the　results　of　the　initial　attack　were　described
as四breathtaking’1：
The　warls　ope血ig　barrage　was　a　bold　effort　to　kill　Saddam　Hussein　and
other　toP　leaders　of　his　regime　even　befbre　a　large－scale　invasion　had　started・
Reacting　quickly　to　intelligence　that　lraqi　leaders　were　holed　up　in　a　bunker，
American　ships　frr・ed　nearly　40　cnlise　missiles丘om　the　Persian　Gulf　and
Red　Sea，　and　stealth　fighters　dropped　bombs　on　the　compound　shortly　after．
It　was　a　breathtaking　example　of　coordmation　and　precision．
　　Whereas　the　Asahi’s　major　concern　is　the　lives　of　Iraqi　citizens，　the
editorial　of　the　1＞y7　pays　attention　to　the　degree　of　success　of　the　attacks・
The　editorial　argues　that　success　of　the　initial　attack　of　the　Iraq　War　remains
uncertain．　This　is　because　of　the　fact　that　the　effectiveness　of　high－tech
weapons　was　exaggerated　by　the　media　during　the　l　991　gulf　war－一一even　that
war　was　a　real　victory　fbr　America．　Thus，　the　editorial　proposes　fbur
benchmarks　that　can　be　used　to　measure　the　progress　of　the　ongoing　military
campaign．　These　proposals　are：command　of　the　air，　protection　the　oil　fields，
speed，　and　most　importantly，　creating　welcoming　attitude　among　Iraqi
citizens．　These　pieces　of　advice　are　stated　to　help　obtain　1’the　ultimate　prize”：
the　control　of　Baghdad．　The　article　predicates　that”wise　handling　ofthe　end
game　will　be　the　final　measure　of　allied　success．”
　　The　fbur　benchmarks　proposed　in　the　editorial　are，　indeed，　constmcted
through　the　eyes　of　military　commanders．　First，　the　editorial　claims　the
”command　of　the　air”is　important　because”allied　planes　will　need　to　sweep
Iraq，s　feeble　air　fbrce　from　the　skies　and　suppress　its　air　defenses，　a　more
difficult　task．”Second，　the　article　urges　that　ground　fbrces　must　protect　the
oil　fields　quickly　because　Iraq　has　already　set　oil　wells　on　fire　befbre　they
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飴ll　into　American　hands．　It　fUrther　notes：”　failure　to　do　so　will　risk　the　loss
of　an　asset　important　fbr　rebuilding　the　country．”The　third　proposal　is　quick
actions，　aiming　to　contain　the　conf【ict　inside　Iraq．　The　editorial　claims　that
speed　is　very　critical　in　preventing　Iraqi　missile　attacks　on　Israel．　Once　Israel
retaliates，　the　article　suggests，　the　anger　of　the　Muslim　world　will　be　gravely
incited　and　tough　diplomacy　will　be　needed　by　the　US．　Also，　the　article
notes　that　quick　action　will　keeps　Kurds　and　Turks　from　clashing　into　a
battle　in　Northem　Iraq．　Thus，　the　article　proposes　that”airbome　troops　will
need　to　establish　a　presence　quickly　l）efbre　the　north　disintegrates　into
chaos．”Fourth　and　most　cmcial　the　editorial　notes，　is　the　creation　of　a
welcoming　attitude　to　Iraqi　citizens．　To．4sahi’s　editors，　the　fourth
benchmark　the　NYT’s　editorial　offers　sounds　very　controversial，　The　NYT’s
editorial　provides　only　a　neat　public　relations　idea　fbr　the　US　fbrces　among
Iraqi　citizens，　whereas　the　most　important　concem　of　the　Asahi’s　editorial　is
protecting　Iraqi　citizens．　Furthermore，　the　IVπsuggests　having　a　good
”package”　to　controls　the　images　of　the　forces　in　order　to　justify　the　War．
Theノ〉’YTts　editorial　states：
Nothing　could　make　this　invasion　look　better　around　the　world　than
evidence　that　it　is　welcomed　by　the　lraqis　themselves．　So　mass　defections　by
Itaqi　soldiers　and　crowds　ofjoyous　civilians　hailing　the　invaders　as　liberators
would　be　very　goOd　signs．　If　that　is　going　to　happen，　it　will　most　1ikely　be　in
the　south，　where　morale　is　said　to　be　low　among　Ifaqi　troops　and　where
Shiite　Muslirns　have　long　been　in　conflict　With　the　Hussein　regime．　By　the
same　token，　nothing　could　damage　the　justification　for　this　war　more　than
extensive”collateral　damage，”harming　great　numbers　of　civilians．
Pr㏄ision－guided　weapons　will　be　relied　on　to　keep　the　damage　limited　to
military　targets，　and　military　leaders　have　pledged　to　avoid　civilian
casualties．　If　they　fail，　it　Will　be　a　black　mark　on　the　invasion．
D．The　Editorials　of　Both　Papers　on　the　Fal1　of　Baghdad
　　The　fall　of　Baghdad　was　a　symbolic　incident：the　toppling　of　a　statue　of
Saddam　Hussein　at　a　square　in　central　Baghdad．　This　incident　was　a　most
crucial　media　spectacle　as　well　as　it　marking　the　genuine　ove血ming　of　the
long－standing　ruler　in　Iraq．
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1）The・Asahi
　　The．Allahi’s　portrayal　of　this　incident　is　very　cynica1，　to　say　the　least．　The
editorial　on　the　US－led　fbrces’control　of　Baghdad　is　filled　with　pessimistic
perspectives　of　the　US　actions　in　Iraq（”A食er　the　War　in　Iraq’Might　Makes
Right’not　the　Road　to　Real　Progress，”April　21，2003）．　As　this　title　indicates，
the　editorial　seeks　for　fUndamental　change　in　US　polices　in　lraq．
　　The　editorial　first　cites　the　statement　of　President　Bush　made　soon　after　a
statue　of　Saddam　Hussein　was　removed丘om　the　streets　in　central　Baghdad．
The　Asahi　regards　the　statement”Human　beings　yeam　fbr丘eedom．　That　is　a
God－givell　doctrine”as　self」congratulatory　remarks　without　understanding
the　ramification　of　the　War．　Then，　the　article　refers　to　the　fact　that　the　some
of　the　American　media　is　jubilant　about　the　fact　that　the　entire　nation　of　lraq
came　under　the　control　of　U．S．　and　British　fbrces　with　relatively　little　loss　of
the　lives　of　coalition　lives．　Also，　the　article　finds　that　several　Japanese　media
has　started　to　rationalize　the　US　actions　in　Iraq．　The　editoria1，　however，
wams　that　the　situation　is　not　as　simple　as　those　media　organizations　both　in
the　US　and　Japan　think　it　is．　The　article　continues：
Many　media　in　America　praised　the　victory，　with　neo－conservative
magazines　malCing　bullish　declarations　that　this　victory　markS　the　return　of　a
”strong　America，”and　that　the　war　agahlst　terrorist　states　had　gotten　off　to　an
”auspicious　start．”The　tone　of　Japanese　newspapers　and　other　media　also
tended　to　argue　that　the　legitimacy　of　the　decision　by　the　United　States　and
Britain　to　go　to　war　was　proved．　Reasons　cited　in　that　argument　included　the
easy　victory　of　the　coalition　fbrces，　as　well　as　upbeat　reports　on　the　liberation
of　the　Laq　people　fk）m　Saddam，s　bruta1　regirne．＿We　questio恥　however，
whether　the　situation　is　really　so　simple．　It　woUld　be　risky　to　simply　forget
matters　of　greater　importance．　Above　all　else，　this　refers　to　the　great
sacrifices　that　have　accompanied　the　victory　on　the　battlefield．
The　rationale　of　the　waming　is，　among　other　things，　the　damage　of　Iraqi
civilians．　The　article　notes　on　the　suffering　of　Iraqi　people，　including　Iraqi
soldiers：
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The　number　of　haqi　civilian　lives　lost血the　air　strikes　is　estmated血止e
出ousandS．　The　ranks　of血e珂ured　anlount　to　several　t㎞es出at　number，
With　many　suffe血g　because　they　cannot　obtain　adequate　medical　treatment
for　their　woundS．　The　number　of　Iraqi　soldiers　killed血血e　coI血ict　is　yet
unknown，　but　must　certainly　defy　any　comparison　with　the　moderate　losses
on　the　U．S．　and　British　side．
The　editorial　also　concems　difficulties　in　reconstructing　postwar　Iraq　by
noting　that”the　task　of　rebuilding　a　nation　comprised　of　a　complex　mix　of
different　religious　sects　and　tribes　will　not　be　an　easy　one．　Signs　of
confusion　are　already　appearing　in　the　move　to　establish　a　working
transitional　governing　body，”
　　The　paper　points　out　that　the　United　Nations　was”a　big　loser　in　this　game，
having　been　summarily　snubbed　by　the　United　States　and　Britain，”and　also
the　organization　seems　destined　fbr　fUrther　complications　because　U．S．
1eaders　are　reluctant　to　involve　the　United　Nations　in　the　rule　of　postwar
Iraq，　while　France　and　Germany　still　support　the　role　of　the　UN　in　its
reCOnStrUCtlOn．
　　The　Asahi’s　standpoint　remains　anti－US，　The　editorial　suggests　the
troubled　relationships　between　the　US　and　Europe　haws　deepened　the
European　distrust　of　America　in　a　wide　range　of　policies　such　as　a　ban　on
nuclear　weapons　testing　and　solutions　for　global　warming．　According　to　the
paper，　one　growing　Problem　is　the　increasing　Power　of　neo－conservatives　in
the　United　States　who　may”exacerbate　the　split　between　America　and
Europe　and　bolster　the　belief　in　the　irrelevance　of　the　United　Nations．”The
editorial　contrasts　the”lawfUI　UNll　and　the”bellicose”US，　and　provides　a
prediction　that　the　anti－US　sentiments　of　other　countries　renders　a
troublesome　scenario．　It　explains：what　will　come　about　if　the　UN．－centered
”control　by　law”is　vanquished　by”rule　by　fbrce”？One　dark　scenario　is
rampant　support　fbr　the　logic　of　opposing　the　United　States　with　weapons　of
mass　destnlction，　terrorism　and　any　other　means　available，　leading　to　a
chaotic　and　danger－packed　world．”
　　To　avoid　the　problem，　the．4sahi’s　editorial　proposes　that　one　of　the　maj　or
tasks　that　America　is　facing　is　reassurance　of　the　United　Nations’　authorities，
and　that　the　intemational　community　also　has　to　seek　a　way　to　lure　America
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back　under　the　reign　of　the　United　Nations．　This　is　because”there　is　no
organization　that　plays　a　greater　role　in　working　fbr　peacefUl　solutions　to
disputes　than　the　United　Nations．”The　article，　however，　considers　the　effort
”the　tremendous　challenge　of　how　to　tmly　prevent　the　spread　of　terrorism．”
　　The　editorial　implies　a　possibility　of　refbmling　the　UN’s　anti－terrorism
fUnctions，　but　its　emphasis　is　on　the　effbrt　of　America　and　its　allies　because
電蜜regardless　of　how　great　a　superpower　it　has　become，　it［America】ca皿ot
fUnction　alone　in　the　global　community．”Thus，　the　article　argues　that　action
must　be　taken　by　U．S．　allies　to　firmly　convince　America　to　debate　in　the
arenas　of　the　United　Nations．　The　paper　brings　up　an　anecdote　of　G㍑〃iver’s
Travels　written　by　Jonathan　Swift．
Taking　stock　of　the　current　power　balance，　we　wonder　if　the　Bush
administration　does　not　indeed　View　the　United　Nations　as　being　intent　on
stealing　away　itS　fteedoms－much　1ike　the　Lilliputians　used　ropes　to　tie　down
mighty　Gulliver．　In　fact，　that　metaphor　is　currently　finding　considerable
sympathy　and　acceptance　around　the　world．．．．If　Gulliver　were　to　wrest
free　of　the　ropes　and　go　on　a　rampage，　the　giant　itself　would　also　fmd　it
diflicult　to　live　and　prosper　in　the　midst　of　the　chaotic　mayhem　most　1ikely
to　f（）llOW．
（2）Theノ＞2w　York　Ti〃1es
　　As　opposed　to　the　pessimistic、Asahi’s　editorial　over　the　US　invasion　into
Iraq，　the　New　York乃〃1es’editorial　on　the　fall　of　Baghdad（’，The　Fall　of
Baghdad，”April　10，2003）is　jubilant　about　the　demise　of　the　Hussein
regime．　The　editorial　states　that”the　murderous　reign　of　Saddam　Hussein
effectively　ended　yesterday　as　downtown　Baghdad　slipped　from　the　grip　of
the　Iraqi　regime　and　citizens　streamed　into　the　streets　to　celebrate　the　sudden
disintegration　of　Mr．　Hussein’s　24－year　dictatorship．”The　article，　indeed，
celebrates　the　ousting　of　Saddam　Hussein．　The　paper　claims　that”the　scene
in　central　Baghdad，　where　jubilant　Iraqis　and　American　marines　collaborated
in　toppling　a　huge　statUe　of　Mr．　Hussein，　signaled　that　a　complete　American
military　victory　in　Iraq　may　be　achieved　within　a　matter　of　days，　not
months．”The　editorial　continues　with　a　hilarious　tone：
95
The　sWiftness　of　the　American　advance　and血e　relatively　low　number　of
American　and　British　casualties　reflect　a　well－designed　battle　plan　and　the
effective　use　of　air　power　to　weaken　and　demoraliZe　lraq曾s　ground　fbrces．
The　numbers　of　Iraqi　casualties，　military　and　civilian，　remain　to　be
determi　ied，　but　they　are　hkely　to　be　considerable．
　　The　editorial　acknowledges　the　criticism　on　the　US　actions　into　Iraq
（”Opinion　about　This　War　has　been　Divided　from　the　Beginning．”）．　The
paper’s　fbcus　is，　nonetheless，　different．　The　editorial　suggests　that　it　is
important　to　fbcus　on　rebuilding　lraq　after　the　dictator　is　gone．　The　tone　of
the　description　may　sound　hypocritical，　compared　with　that　of　the．4sahi．
The　paper　notes，”Now　that　Mr．　Hussein’s　rule　has　ended，　there　is　unity
among　good－hearted　people　everywhere，　a　hope　that　what　comes　next　fbr　the
Iraqi　people　will　be　a　better，　freer　and　saner　life　than　the　one　they　had
befbre．”Also，　the　importance　of　peacekeeping　is　emphasized　because”cities
where　the　sudden　collapse　of　the　govemment　has　left　a　power　vacuum　that
invites　lawlessness．　In　the　absence　of　civil　govemment，　there　is　an　ominous
potential　for　strife　and　bloodshed　in　a　nation　ripe　with　ethnic　divisions　and
hatreds．”While　the　editorial　wams　of　the　necessity　to　stabilize　the　country，　it
positively　summarizes　the　event　by　noting　that”the　removal　of　Saddam
Hussein’s　regime　can　be　the　opening　chapter　in　a　positive　and　historic
transformation　of　lraq．”
V．Conclusion　and　Future　Research
　　This　paper　has　argued　that　the　problem　of　comparison　betWeen　different
cultUres　derives　from　tWo　types　of’，facts　tt：one　is　a”brute　fact，”and　the　other
is韓institutionalized　fact．曾曾’，Institutionalized　fact．鱒is　socially　constructed　by
the　traditions　and　cultUres　inherited　in　the　given　society．　Because　of　the
latter，　analyzing　different　cultures　needs　special　attention．
　　After　discussed　theories　of　social　constructions　and　the　debate　over
positivism，　the　latter　half　of　this　paper　empirically　examined　the　concept　of
”evil”in　two　different　stUdies．　First，　the　research　by　Alfbrd　suggests　that　the
notion　of”evil”in　South　Korea　is　quite　different　from　that　in　Western
nations．　Second，　my　own　research　on　editorials　of　Japanese　and　American
print　media　finds　that　different　implications　over　the　word”evil”exists　in
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the　two　media．
　　Since　the　scope　of　my　research　is　limited，　further　comprehensive
qualitative　and　possible　quantitative　analyses　are　needed　to　understand　the
notion　of　evil　during　the　War　in　Iraq．　For　example，　another　term　may
broaden　the　horizons　of　this　comparison　of　the　media　contents　across　the
Pacific．　One　of　these　terms　may　be　the　word”invasion．’1　There　were　some
discussions　over　this　term　in　Japanese　media．　Although　the　Japanese
equivalent　word　of”invasion”is”shinryaku”（entering　fbrcibly）；the
Japanese　word　has　a　stronger　connotation　than　the　English　equivalent．　While
the　Asahi　use　the　term”shinryaku”from　the　beginning　of　the　War，　some
print　media，　such　as　the　Sankei　or　the　Yo〃liuri，　disliked　the　strong
connotation　and　employed　the　word”shinkou，”advancing　troops，　instead．
From　the　begiming　of　the　War，　the　？＞YT　use　the　word　”invasion．”It　seems
that　there　is　no　big　debate　in　the　United　States　over　the　word”invasion”and
lts　connotatlon．
　　Also，　the　roles　of　public　opinion　must　be　investigated．　It　may　be　logical　to
surmise　that　differences　of　public　opinion　between　the　United　States　and
Japan　may　be　one　of　the　significant　causes　fbr　the　different　portraits　of　the
War　by　the　two　media．　This　is　because　any　media　organization　is　supposed
to　mirror　the　opinion　of　strata　of　its　society．　Since　both　the．Asahi　and　the
NYT　are　one　of　the　largest　newspapers　in　each　country，　the　articles　in　both
papers　reflect　public　in　Japan　and　the　United　States，　respectively．　Further，
their　government’s　positions　over　the　Iraq　issues　affect　public　opinion　and
the　contents　of　the　media　both　in　the　US　and　Japan．　Different　press－politics
relationship　is　an　especially　important　aspect　to　investigate・
　　Finally，　these　further　examinations　may　enlarge　the　scope　of
understanding　cultUres，　Comparison　of　the　papers　in　different　cultures　may
make　us　sensitive　to　differences　with　other　cultUres．　Comparing　texts　written
in　different　languages　needs　special　attention，　which　eventually　deepens　our
perception　toward　a　different　society．
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（日本語要約）
　　　　　　　　「悪」の社会構築
一イラク戦争についての日米のメディアの比較分析
前　嶋　和　弘
　本論文では、イラク戦争（2003年3月20日から同年5月1日）につい
ての日本（『朝日新聞』）とアメリカ（『ニューヨークタイムズ』）の両紙の社
説の質的な内容分析を行なっている。分析の結果、日米で戦争における「悪」
の概念が大きく異なっている事実が明らかになった。具体的には、『ニュー
ヨークタイムズ』においては、大量破壊兵器製造の計画を進め、イラク市民
を抑圧する“独裁者”フセインが「悪」として描かれているのに対し、r朝
日新聞』においては、多くの一般市民の犠牲者を生む戦争そのものが「悪」
として描かれている。『朝日新聞』においても、フセインが好ましい政治的
指導者ではないことが指摘されているが、国連による話し合いの機会を重視
せず、戦争行為を仕掛けるアメリカ側の方が「悪」であるという描かれ方と
なっている。
　本論文では、異なった概念が構築される事実を理論付けるために、まず、
社会構築の理論や概念を説明する。さらに、社会構築の概念の違いがしばし
ば大きな問題となる異文化研究の困難さについて、「未開社会」をめぐるピ
ーター・ウインチの議論や、実証主義をめぐるカール・ポッパーとトーマ
ス・クーンの論争を紹介する。さらに、C・ブレッド・アルフォードの研究
に基づき、キリスト教的な概念に基づく「悪」が、東アジア圏である韓国で
は存在しないだけでなく、韓国では、グローバリズムこそ欧米における「悪」
に近い概念となっている、という論点を検証する。最後に、イラク戦争につ
いての日米メディアの比較をまとめ、「悪」が異なった概念として構築され
ているほか、国連や市民の犠牲者についての報道の違いなども分析している。
